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Abstract
Political struggles and competitions are conf lictual by their very nature, 
and if not well managed can lead to violence. As political parties are 
crucial actors in political processes, it is vital to understand the roles they 
play in escalating or de-escalating political violence. This paper provides 
an analysis of political parties in Kenya and South Africa, focusing on 
their linkages to political violence. It concludes that political parties are 
indispensable actors in peacebuilding. The design and implementation of 
peacebuilding interventions that effectively target political violence must 
therefore anticipate the involvement of political parties. This applies to 
both case study countries, but most probably to other countries as well. 
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One of the means which social groupings have over the years used to 
formalise their struggles and competition has been political parties. 
Political parties are not only a means of inf luencing outcomes of elections, 
but they are also the most credible outlets for the meaningful participation 
of individuals in political processes (Gauja 2016:44). Political struggles and 
competitions are conf lictual by their very nature and if not well managed, 
can lead to violence. Kenya and South Africa have both had histories replete 
with organised political struggles and competition.  In South Africa, the 
political struggles and competitions have involved clashes between Britons 
and Boers1 (Katz 1987:148), non-white resistance to the white-initiated 
policy of Apartheid (Zuidema 2002:11) and black-on-black clashes for 
political supremacy (Marks and Andersson 1990:54). Despite long periods 
of disenfranchisement in South Africa, political organisations were an 
available means for political expression by non-whites. In Kenya on the 
other hand, political struggles and competitions have been prominent 
between Africans and British colonial rulers (Durrani 2008:191) as well 
as among Africans themselves, with the most visible causes being ethnic 
divisions (Ahere 2012:33; Ayindo 2017:207).
The interactions between and among political parties and organisations 
in Kenya and South Africa have caused political violence. Beyond the 
divisive issue of elections, political parties in both countries have resorted 
to violence when their members disagree during competitive political 
processes such as parliamentary debates and street demonstrations.
The recurrence of political violence has continued to be a cause for concern 
for the respective governments as well as the civil societies. The adoption 
of new constitutional dispensations in South Africa (1997) and Kenya 
(2010) targeted many institutions with the aim of reforming the respective 
1 Boer, Dutch for ‘farmer’, is a South African of Dutch, German or Huguenot descent, 
especially one of the early settlers of the Transvaal and the Orange Free State. 
The descendants of the Boers are these days commonly referred to as Afrikaners 
(Gooch 2000:ix).
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societies in order to obviate recurrent violence. The structural reforms 
were so extensive and progressive that they may be said to have laid the 
foundation for what Lederach (2014:3) and Galtung (2007:14) refer to as 
conf lict transformation.2
Despite the afore-mentioned reforms, political parties have continued 
to remain the weakest links of the national infrastructures for peace 
(NIfPs) in both countries. Kumar and De la Haye (2012:14) underscore 
the significance of NIfPs3 in countries where structural conf licts are 
inherent. Anarchist theorists like George Woodcock would however 
question the efficacy of political parties in NIfPs, given that political 
parties are themselves imbued with the aim to seize the state machine that 
seeks to concentrate power, monopolise violence and perpetuate hierarchy 
(Woodcock 1962:31), whereas NIfPs aim to prevent conf licts and build 
peace. That said, the evolution of peacebuilding as a practice in Kenya and 
South Africa has seen the appreciation of political parties and organisations 
as crucial to National Peace Committees given that they offer citizenry the 
avenues for ventilating their political aspirations and by extension promote 
dialogue and consultation, which are pivotal in furthering sustainable 
peace (Odendaal 2012:47). 
It is vital to understand the roles that political parties play in escalating 
or de-escalating political violence in Kenya and South Africa. 
This basic understanding can generate knowledge, which when properly 
contextualised, can be crucial in discerning how it relates to the present, and 
useful in peacebuilding intervention programming (Graseck 2008:367). 
This paper, therefore, provides an analysis of political parties in Kenya 
2 Conflict transformation is the envisioning of and responding to the ebb and flow of social 
conflict as life-giving opportunities for creating constructive change processes that reduce 
violence, increase justice in direct interaction and social structures, and respond to real-life 
problems in human relationships (Galtung 2007:14).
3 Defined within the context of this paper as the ‘… dynamic network of interdependent 
structures, mechanisms, resources, values, and skills which, through dialogue and 
consultation, contribute to conflict prevention and peace-building in a society’ 
(Kumar and Haye 2012:14). 
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and South Africa, focusing on their linkages to political violence. This 
analysis is used in underscoring the indispensability of political parties as 
actors in peacebuilding efforts in both countries. 
2. Methodology 
The information collected is from primary and secondary sources, and 
consists of questionnaires, interviews,4 conference papers and reports, 
research reports, policy briefs, journal articles, books, websites and other 
reliable publications that provide histories of political parties as well as 
political violence in Kenya and South Africa. 
Trochim and others (2015:21) acknowledge that the first step in deciding 
how data can be analysed is to define a unit of analysis. For the purpose of 
this paper, the following units of analysis have been used: colonial heritage, 
ideological standpoints, ethno-racial motivations, and the type of political 
systems in place. This will set the stage for analysis of the linkages between 
political parties and political violence in both countries.
3. Historical analysis of political parties 
3.1 Heritage of colonisation and Apartheid
Carey (2002:55) argues that the colonial heritage that was inherited at a 
country’s independence had a significant impact on the shape and evolution 
of political parties in that country and in Africa. Whereas political parties’ 
formation in Kenya and South Africa can be examined through the lens of 
colonial heritage, the South African context presents an additional lens of 
scrutiny – that of the era of Apartheid. 
4 Due to ethical concerns, pseudonyms are used to mask identities of interviewees and 
questionnaire respondents. Interviews and questionnaires were conducted in Durban and 
Pietermaritzburg (South Africa) as well as in Nairobi (Kenya) between November 2017 
and February 2018.
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3.1.1 Heritage of colonialism in Kenya 
Until 1960, the British colonial authorities in Kenya prohibited the 
formation of nationwide political parties in order to suppress African 
national aspirations. Political organisations were only allowed to operate 
at the district level. Even then, Anderson (2005:549) affirms, the British 
continued by rewarding their allies while punishing their enemies. 
In Central Province, British colonial officers rejected attempts to form 
political parties. This was based on the perceived support of the Mau5 by 
the Agĩkũyũ ethnic group that inhabits the province (Anderson 2005:549). 
In the rural parts of the Rift Valley Province on the other hand, the formation 
of political parties was encouraged by colonial authorities partly due to 
the delay in the Kalenjin and Maasai ethnic groups organising themselves 
politically. It can be inferred that the aim of the colonial authorities was 
to minimise the Agĩkũyũ political inf luence while encouraging and/or 
uplifting that of the Kalenjin and Maasai.
Upon the lifting of the ban and the calling for elections in 1961, two major 
parties were formed: the Kenya African National Union (KANU) and the 
Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU). Barkan (cited in Carey 2002:56) 
contends that these parties ‘were basically loose coalitions of the district 
and local level political organizations’. Apart from ideological differences 
which will be discussed in a subsequent section in this paper, it is important 
to note that the period between lifting of the ban on nationwide parties 
and the holding of national elections was short and might have inf luenced 
the choice by African political luminaries to combine the afore-mentioned 
coalitions in order to form two national parties. It is these two parties that 
participated in the negotiation for Kenya’s independence in 1963.
5 The Mau Mau was a militant revolt for liberation from colonialism that triggered the 
British declaration of a State of Emergency in Kenya from 1952 to 1960. While explaining 
that the Mau Mau had nationwide support, Ogot (2003:9) disagrees with the ‘populist’ 




3.1.2 Heritage of colonialism and Apartheid in South Africa
Political formations in South Africa have historically been shaped by the 
relations amongst whites (Britons vs. Boers) on the one hand and on the 
other hand, the attitude of other races towards white domination. 
Briton-Boer relations, especially after the Second Anglo-Boer War 
(1899–1902), were fractured and this inf luenced the establishment of the 
white-dominated parties ahead of the formation of the Union of South 
Africa, a result of the granting of nominal independence by the British 
parliament in 1910. Maloka (2014:230) observes that white-dominated 
political parties were divided between those aligned to the English 
interest (the South African Party, the United Party, the Unionist Party, the 
Progressive Federal Party and its predecessor Progressive Party, the New 
Republic Party and the Democratic Party) and those affiliated to the Boers 
(the National Party, Afrikaner Party and the Conservative Party). 
It is striking, however, that both sets of white-dominated parties were 
discriminatory against non-whites as they steered the country towards 
the formation of the Union of South Africa. They did this through 
disenfranchisement. This unity of purpose lasted through the formalisation 
of Apartheid in 1948, until after the 1966 elections when more Britons 
began to vote for the National Party after it had successfully projected itself 
as the party that represented white interests in conditions of increasing 
isolation and insecurity (Maloka 2014:231). 
Galvanised by their displeasure with ‘the pro-white policies of the British 
colonial administrators followed by the discriminatory legislation enacted 
by the Union of South Africa’, non-whites formed political bodies for 
purposes of vocalising and advocating their social, political and economic 
rights, especially after the Second Anglo-Boer War (South African History 
Online 2011b: para. 17). This led to the establishment of organisations such 
as the Natal Native Congress, formed in 1902 to present African grievances 
to the colonial government (African National Congress 1982:5) and the 
African People’s Organisation, which was formed in 1902 to represent 
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the interests of Coloureds6 (South African History Online 2011a: para. 2). 
Also formed was the South African Native National Congress (SANNC) that, 
according to Maina and others (2004:155), was the first African political 
party, formed in 1912, to oppose the discrimination against Africans in 
the South African Constitution of 1910. In 1923, SANNC was renamed the 
African National Congress (ANC). Another organisation set up around the 
same period was the Inkatha Liberation Movement, which was formed in 
the 1920s to preserve the unity of the Zulu nation (Deegan 2014:16).
Ultimately, the formation, growth, agendas and relationships of all 
categories of the afore-mentioned parties were heavily inf luenced by the 
discriminatory policies from the colonial and Apartheid periods.
3.2 Ideological orientations 
Just as has often been the case with political organisations elsewhere in the 
world, the formation of most major political parties in Kenya and South 
Africa has been based on ideology, which is defined by Jost and others 
(2009:309) as a set of beliefs about the proper order of society and how it 
can be achieved. These are normally set out in the articles of association of 
the political parties and used as the basis of developing their manifestos. 
Ideally, ideologies determine the convergence or divergence of the positions 
of different political parties on issues. Be that as it may, there are political 
parties that, based on their political actions or inactions, could be said to 
be driven by a pragmatism shaped by political opportunism.
3.2.1 The discourse on devolution in Kenya  
In Kenya, the formation of independence parties was based on ideological 
differences. KANU, who were the victors of the 1963 general elections, 
the last before independence, and KADU had divergent views on the 
shape of the post-independence state. Whereas KANU favoured a unitary 
system, KADU preferred majimboism. The latter means ‘regionalism’ and 
its promoters argued that decentralisation of political power to regions 
6 In South Africa, the term ‘Coloured’ refers to an individual of mixed race, as opposed to 
indigenous Africans or whites of European ancestry (Pinchuck et al. 2002:81).
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of equal status would protect smaller communities from dominance by 
larger communities (Anderson 2005:547). However, the unitary system 
proponents prevailed when KADU disbanded and joined KANU in 
1964 before the transformation of the country into a one-party state 
(Materu 2015:23). 
Nevertheless, the seeds of majimboism had been sown and they never 
died. Amid the excesses and malfeasance of the unitary state under 
KANU, especially in marginalisation of sections of the country, the debate 
re-emerged in the 1990s, when political parties began a demand for a new 
constitution. In fact, the 2010 constitution, negotiated after the 2008 post-
election violence, has at its core the devolution of government and resource 
management to structures known as Counties. 
There is, however, a school of thought that contends that political parties 
in Kenya, with the exception of the independence parties, are driven less 
by ideology and more by the political ambitions of their leaders. Mutua 
(2016: para. 6) surmises that political parties in Kenya are empty husks 
for individual politicians to seek and keep political power. It is no wonder 
that during election years, politicians have been known to hop from one 
party to the other the moment they lose in the primaries. At one point, 
the chairperson of the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission 
(IEBC) described this habit as ‘political immorality’ (Mayabi 2012: para. 4). 
3.2.2 Apartheid versus the Freedom Charter in South Africa
Most political parties of note in South Africa have had, as a basis for 
their formation and existence, development policy doctrines for which 
they stand. Given the country’s history of identity struggles and racial 
discrimination, the discourse on development policies became the glue 
that bonded like-minded political elites into forming political parties.
Legassick (1974:5) observes that the Boer vision of a South Africa driven 
by self-development in separate areas of the country delineated by race, 
inf luenced the formation and growth of the National Party which went on 
to legislate Apartheid when it came to power in 1948. 
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Before the end of Apartheid (and even after), a majority of the non-
white dominated political parties coalesced around doctrines that 
were diametrically opposed to racial discrimination. The pillars of this 
coalescence were the tenets of the Freedom Charter. This Charter was the 
product of the South African Congress Alliance7 and outlined the core 
principles of the demand for and commitment to a non-racial South Africa. 
The Freedom Charter contains elements of liberalism in its references to 
the protection of human rights, some elements of socialism in its call 
for nationalisation and redistribution of wealth, and Africanism with 
its observation that the people had ‘been robbed of their birth right’ in 
terms of their black identity, cultures and heritage of their ancestral land 
(Sisk 2017:150).    
3.3 Ethno-racial motivations
Closely tied to the ideological orientations mentioned above is the issue 
of identity. In Kenya and South Africa, the identity question behind the 
formation and consolidation of political parties manifests itself in nuanced 
ways. Issues of racial divisions are prominent in South Africa whereas 
tribal differences apply in Kenya.
3.3.1 Tribal Politics in Kenya
The negotiation for independence pitted KANU against KADU. The former 
was synonymous with the politically dominant tribes of Agĩkũyũ and Luo 
while the latter was formed as a coalition of minority tribes who feared loss 
of land in the future as a result of the policies of the dominant communities 
(Maxon and Ofcansky 2014:158).
Maloba (1995:17) argues that the notion of political parties, whose 
foundations and existence are perceived to be ethnic identification, is an 
indicator of the failure of national politics. This manifested when, after 
7 The South African Congress Alliance consisted of the ANC, the South African Indian 
Congress, the South African Congress of Democrats and the Coloured People’s Congress. 




independence, suppression of political rivals and dissidents led to what 
Mazrui (cited in Maloba 1995:17) refers to as ‘retribalisation’ of politics. 
This occurs when the national centre or elite is viewed as unfair, especially 
when ethnic equations are used in determining the access to and control of 
national assets and opportunities. In this case, those who are not included 
may opt for sectional identification as a source of strength and safety. 
This explains the formation of the Kenya People’s Union (KPU) in 1966 
following the disagreement between Jomo Kenyatta, the first President of 
Kenya (Agĩkũyũ) and his Vice-President, Oginga Odinga (Luo). During the 
three-year period that the KPU existed before being banned by Kenyatta, 
it drew its support mainly from the Luo in Nyanza Province who had felt 
suddenly marginalised by the centre.
The period after legalisation of multipartyism in 1991 opened the doors to 
political parties formed around ethnic coalitions, especially during election 
years. The trend since independence has been for political parties keen 
on securing control of government to form multi-ethnic political party 
coalitions around four main tribes (out of approximately 42): Agĩkũyũ, 
Luhya, Luo and the Kalenjin. In fact, each of the four presidents that 
Kenya has had, rose to power based on the strong support of two or more 
coalitions of the afore-mentioned tribes (Kagwanja and Southall 2010:9).    
3.3.2 The ‘Rainbow Nation’ and the political parties representing it
It is not uncommon to hear South Africa being referred to as the ‘rainbow 
nation’. This is a product of the discourse that took place during the 
negotiation process for the end of Apartheid wherein arose the question 
of what would define a South African identity. The term ‘rainbow nation’ 
was therefore coined to symbolise the new South Africa in which there 
is recognition of the unity of multi-culturalism and convergence of 
people of many nations within a country once plagued by discrimination 
(Mapungubwe Institute for Strategic Reflection [MISTRA] 2014:76). 
The nature of political parties representing the interests of the ‘rainbow 
nation’ have throughout history been influenced by these realities of diversity.
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However, Respondent Three (2017) suggests that in post-Apartheid South 
Africa, political party affiliation still is predicated along racial lines – 
the Democratic Alliance being mostly supported by whites and people of 
mixed-race, and the ANC by blacks. Van Tonder (2015: para. 7) cautiously 
challenges this line of thought by arguing that even though the Democratic 
Alliance was once a white-dominated party and operating under racist 
laws legislated by the National Party, it now has support from non-white 
voters due to its liberal principles which opposed Apartheid from within 
the system. In addition, it elected Mmusi Maimane as the party’s first 
black African leader in May 2015.
Lieberman (2003:188) points out that even though there are indications 
that membership and support of political parties exhibit a racial dimension, 
it is interesting that after 1994 none of the leading parties have mobilised 
their membership based on explicit racial or ethnic claims, and all of them 
have attempted to attract supporters across the racial divide. Price (cited 
in Lieberman 2003:189) agrees with these sentiments, noting that parties 
such as the Pan African Congress (PAC) and the Freedom Front that did 
try to mobilise membership based on racial or ethnic divides, suffered 
dismal electoral returns. Even the radical leftist Economic Freedom 
Fighters (EFF) party which is perceived to have most of its support from 
black South Africans, entered into an unexpected coalition with the 
Democratic Alliance8 after the 2016 municipal elections in order to lock 
out the ANC from governing the metros of Johannesburg, Tshwane and 
Nelson Mandela Bay.
3.4 The political systems
The existence and natures of political parties largely depend on the type 
of political system on which they are domiciled. According to Heslop 
(2017: para. 1), a political system is the set of formal legal institutions that 
constitutes a government or a state. Kenya and South Africa are democracies 
8 In terms of ideology, the EFF and the Democratic Alliance are far apart, and many pundits 
have called their coalition a ‘marriage of convenience’ (Mtungwa 2017: para. 1).
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with the most progressive constitutions in Africa, but their systems of 
government do not only differ; they have also taken different historical 
trajectories. Exploring these differences may provide indications about the 
extents to which they have inf luenced the nature of political parties.
3.4.1 Authoritarianism and the journey towards the Third Liberation  
in Kenya 
During the time of the formation of KANU and KADU in 1960, Kenya was 
in essence a multiparty system (Ogot 1995:239). Soon after becoming a 
Republic in 1964, the country was transformed into a one-party state when 
KADU voluntarily dissolved itself and joined KANU. A mass defection of 
left-leaning members of KANU led to the formation of KPU in 1966 before 
the latter was banned by the government in 1969. With the banning of 
KPU, Kenya became a de facto one-party state until 1982 (Aubrey 2003:90). 
In 1982, an attempt was made by the opposition to form the Kenya African 
Socialist Alliance (KASA), but this was nipped in the bud when in June of 
the same year, Parliament amended the constitution and inserted Section 
2A, which transformed Kenya into a de jure one-party state (Ogot 1995:239). 
During the regimes of the first two presidents of Kenya, Jomo Kenyatta 
and Daniel arap Moi, there was little or no tolerance for opposition parties. 
Political expression was only allowed through KANU, which was the only 
party that was legal and/or allowed to exist from 1969 to 1991. 
Multipartyism was reintroduced in 1991 following the repeal of Section 
2A. It was the commencement of a journey by Kenyans towards a system in 
which they could feel free from political economies surrounded by elitism, 
egregious graft and social inequality. Mills and Herbst (2012:7) refer to this 
as the ‘Third Liberation’. Van de Walle and Butler (2007:19) offer a typology 
of political parties that would normally emerge upon the reintroduction of 
multiparty politics. This paper looks at two of them. 
Firstly, there are parties that made the transition from a single party 
regime and continue to play an active role in politics. These include KANU, 
which after the return of multipartyism won the general elections in 1992 
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and 1997. It is important to note that, given its historical strength and 
association with the state, KANU received extensive support in the form 
of patronage, media access and logistical assistance (Throup and Hornsby 
1998:358). 
Secondly, and perhaps the bigger category, are the parties that emerged 
in the course of the transition to multipartyism. This category of parties 
appeared virtually sui generis, shortly before, during or after the afore-
mentioned transition with the aim of competing for power (Van de 
Walle and Butler 2007:20). These new parties often had their origins in 
civil society, which was allowed to exist or somehow existed in spite of 
repression. The leaders of these new parties were often those who had long 
histories of opposition to the one-party regimes.
3.4.2 From a system of racial segregation to a f ledgling democracy in 
South Africa
To many black South Africans, the one and only liberation they have had, 
came at the end of Apartheid. In fact, before Apartheid was ended, the 
Organisation of African Unity classified South Africa as a country that 
had not achieved self-determination (Page 2003:443). To many supporters 
of Apartheid-era white-dominated political parties on the other hand, 
liberation could be tagged to the independence that was obtained in 1910 
when the Union of South Africa came into being. The nature and existence 
of political parties before, during and after each of these liberations 
depended on the legal frameworks and political spaces that the respective 
political systems offered.
Inasmuch as the Boers came to establish a strong political party that ruled 
for more than 40 years, White and Davies (1998:186) claim that it was only 
after the Second Anglo-Boer War that political parties began to form in 
South Africa. Among the indigenous groups, political organisation during 
this period was very low due to the Boer-Briton policies of segregation that 
kept the indigenous groups out of any form of government. 
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However, political organisation became more relevant to all groupings 
in the country after the Second Anglo-Boer War given that the country 
was negotiating its way towards the establishment of the Union. Different 
groupings needed their interests factored in the process.
The political system that emerged after formation of the Union was one 
that excluded the participation of non-white political parties in elections 
and government. A crucial waypoint on the path towards legislation of 
Apartheid was the 1936 removal of black South Africans from the common 
voters roll. This did not, however, prevent political organisation among 
non-whites. Political organisations continued to exist outside of the legal 
frameworks in place and when they started to agitate more aggressively, the 
government tightened the laws to suppress them even more.      
Given its connections to global capitalism at the height of the Cold War, 
and in order to buy tolerance of Western powers to Apartheid, South Africa 
passed the Suppression of Communism Act in 1950, which outlawed any 
political parties affiliated with Communism (De Visser 2005:52). This law, 
and others that came afterwards to strengthen it, defined the existence 
and parameters of political parties throughout the Apartheid era. It gave 
the Minister of Justice unlimited authority to arbitrarily ‘ban’ a person 
or entity. A banned person or entity could not organise/attend meetings, 
publish literature or promote their cause (Beck 2000:129). The ANC, PAC 
and many others were banned under this law and their leaders were forced, 
for fear of long jail sentences or indefinite arbitrary detentions, to go 
underground or operate from outside of South Africa.
The end of Apartheid and the coming into effect of a new progressive 
constitution in 1997 entrenched universal suffrage and multipartyism. 
Ever since, a political party may be registered even if the party is formed 
on the basis of ethnicity, religion, regionalism, tribalism or advocacy of 
secession from the Republic (Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy 
in Africa 2006: para. 4).
So far, this paper has provided a historical analysis of the formation 
and nature of political parties in Kenya and South Africa. The following 
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sections link this analysis with the manifestations of violent contestations 
attributable to political parties and the question of how peacebuilding 
programming can benefit from the historical analysis.
4. Political parties and political violence 
In trying to understand the roles of political parties in political violence, 
it is useful to examine some of the most visible context-specific ways in 
which they escalate or de-escalate political violence in both countries.
4.1 How political parties escalate political violence
4.1.1 Kenya
Political parties can sow the seeds of political violence through enactment 
of certain laws or using state machinery to monopolise the political 
space. When it was in power from 1963 to 1991, KANU perfected this 
by suppressing all forms of dissention and avenues of effective political 
expression. In recent times, it was striking that during the period of 
brinkmanship that followed the Supreme Court’s annulment of the results 
of the August 2017 presidential elections, it was the supporters of the 
opposition coalition, the National Super Alliance (NASA), that bore the 
brunt of excessive use of force by the police, who were under instructions 
by the Jubilee Party-controlled government to quell mass protests (Kenny 
and Ahere 2017: para. 5). However, mass protests by perceived Jubilee Party 
supporters did not receive similar attention from the police even when they 
turned violent or caused public anxiety (Gitonga 2017: para. 4; Maichuhie 
2018: para. 7). From the afore-mentioned situations, it can be argued 
that when some part of  a people are offered very limited or no options 
of ventilating their dissenting political expressions or are prevented from 
political participation, violence begins to become an attractive recourse 
(Saunders 2017:6).
The manner in which political parties reward their followers can also 
cause violent conf licts. Political parties in Kenya tend to favour certain 
classes or certain ethnicities, especially in allocating leadership positions 
in the parties and notably during nomination of candidates to represent 
the respective parties during elections (Respondent Ten 2018). When they 
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come to power, political parties also tend to reward the regions that voted 
for them and punish those that did not. Public appointments and state 
resource allocation would favour the constituencies of the ruling party or 
coalition. As to the few opportunities that would be available to election 
losers, they would be dished out by the victors in order to co-opt individual 
losers within the system – thereby diluting opposition to the incumbents 
and, as Ngunyi (1995:124) notes, ensuring the continuation of the system 
of political patronage. This ‘carrot or stick’ style of politics has continued 
to cultivate deep-seated resentments between the supporters of election 
winners and losers, and raised the stakes in elections since winning is 
synonymous with accessing state resources for the development of a region, 
class or a tribe.
Political parties also instigate political violence through overtly or 
covertly sponsoring violence directed at supporters of opposing parties. 
For instance, there are indications that, in order to authenticate President 
Moi’s early 1990s contention that multipartyism would fracture the 
country along tribal lines, some of the ethnic clashes in the 1992 and 1997 
general elections were orchestrated by KANU. This was through the use 
of violence specialists from the military as well as the police to furtively 
unleash deadly action against civilians (Klopp and Zuern 2007:135). Other 
political parties, notably the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) and 
the Party of National Unity (PNU) also instigated violence, especially in 
2008, that targeted supporters of opposing parties and these incidences of 
violence often took ethnic dimensions (Njogu 2009:4).
The formation and existence of political parties based on ethnicity remain 
strong; and in the run up to the 2017 general elections, political coalitions 
were formed based on ethnic backgrounds of the respective party 
leadership. This was a proximate9 cause of the violence that was triggered 
by the dispute about the presidential election results. 
9 Proximate causes of conflict differ from root causes by degree only and are generally 
necessary to move a society closer to violence. They include such things as entrenchment 
of tribalism, electoral system manipulation, widespread human rights violations. 
For differentiation between root causes, proximate causes and triggers of conflicts, see 
Ahere 2012:32.
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4.1.2 South Africa
The policy of Apartheid made discrimination endemic in the socio-
economic and political processes and thereby cultivated deep-rooted 
conf licts. One of the consequences is the current disequilibrium that sees 
the minority white South Africans continue to control the major part 
of South Africa’s wealth (Respondent One 2017). Some political parties 
have preyed on the exasperations of non-white South Africans about this 
situation and ratcheted up rhetoric that purport to identify with their 
feelings. It has therefore been common to hear of revisionist calls and 
campaign slogans by some political parties. Despite their well-meaning 
intentions, such calls may cause social fractures and anxieties, which if 
not well managed, may lead to violence. 
That said, prominent incidences of political violence after 1994 have not 
only been between political parties but also among different factions 
within political parties. 
Intra-party factionalism and the competition to control the process of 
development of party lists have led to political violence. Nowhere has this 
been felt more than in KwaZulu-Natal province where in the first half of 
2016, there were at least 20 politically motivated deaths (De Haas 2016:48). 
Intra-party violence has mostly affected the ruling ANC where competition 
for seats is fiercest (Gottschalk 2016: para. 8; Respondent Five 2017). 
There are also parties that have meted out violence against opponents in 
competition for political turf. A conspicuous case is the frosty relationship 
between the IFP and National Freedom Party (NFP) whose competition to 
control the KwaZulu-Natal vote has led to violence (Taylor 2011: para. 3). 
It should be noted, however, that in spite of strong indications of political 
party involvement, it is not always possible to clearly mark the boundaries 
of political violence. In some localities, political violence overlaps with the 
taxi industry conf licts. Yet in others, it can be hard to separate political 
killings from other criminally motivated murders. De Haas (2016:44) posits 
that the distinction becomes onerous to make when political office-bearers 
110
John Rabuogi Ahere
have business interests such as in the taxi industry. To compound the matter, 
Izinkabi10 are used in political, taxi as well as criminally motivated killings.
4.2 How political parties de-escalate political violence
4.2.1 Kenya
Political parties have on occasion been able to rise above partisanship and 
pass legislation that is in the interest of peace and stability. Such actions 
have been useful in contributing to defusing structural political conf licts. 
A case in point was the 1997 Inter-Party Parliamentary Group (IPPG), 
which was composed of members of parliament from various parties who 
agreed on the repeal of certain colonial-era laws that restricted freedoms of 
association, and on expanding the composition of the electoral commission 
to bring in the opposition and to lay the groundwork for comprehensive 
constitutional reforms (Mwakikagile 2001:123).  
Another crucial way that political parties have used to de-escalate conf licts 
has manifested itself in those occasions when they have closed ranks during 
periods of unabating political violence and worked in concert with other 
civil society organisations to end the violence and prevent its recurrence 
through advocacy. With initiatives such as the Uwiano Platform for Peace,11 
politicians have found a podium to participate individually and collectively 
in conf lict prevention. There have also been moments when different 
political parties have implemented joint activities aimed at promoting 
peace among communities. An example is when Amani National Congress 
10 Plural of Inkabi, which in isiZulu denotes an individual who is hired to assassinate mostly 
political and/or business competitors. According to Respondent Two (2017), the wars 
between the IFP and the United Democratic Front (UDF) in the 1980s and early 1990s as 
well as the existence of uMkhonto we Sizwe (the paramilitary wing of the ANC) led to a 
situation where after the end of Apartheid, there were a lot of combat-ready young people 
roaming around KwaZulu-Natal with nothing to with their limited labour market skills. 
In their quests to earn a livelihood in a region awash with small arms, these young people 
joined the ranks of Izinkabi. 
11 For more on Uwiano Platform for Peace please see: <http://www.ke.undp.org/content/
kenya/en/home/operations/projects/peacebuilding/uwiano-peace-platform-project.html>. 
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and Ford Kenya political parties’ members in the conf lict-ridden North 
Rift of Kenya teamed up in April 2018 to preach peaceful co-existence in 
the region (Daily Nation 2018).  
4.2.2 South Africa  
On the national stage, political parties came together in 1999 under a 
conf lict management programme. This programme was executed through 
provincial-level conflict management committees, which received election- 
related complaints and proposed ways of handling these amicably before 
they reached the courts or resulted in unrest (Booysen and Masterson 
2009:419). This was followed by the 2009 signing of an electoral Code 
of Conduct by political parties wherein they pledged to eschew activities 
that encouraged violence and also to discipline any of their supporters 
who perpetrated violence (February 2009:61). Both initiatives were con-
ceptualised and implemented through the facilitation of the Independent 
Electoral Commission (IEC). 
The function of the IEC in the afore-mentioned initiatives brings to light 
another important role that political parties have played in the de-escalation 
of political violence. Political parties have, through comprehensive 
legislation and their supportive actions, collectively generated sufficient 
political will in support of the actions that the IEC takes to implement 
the afore-mentioned Code to the letter. According to one of its principal 
electoral officers, this has resulted in the public perception that the IEC is a 
neutral and impartial institution (Respondent Eight 2017). This has made a 
large contribution to reducing violent conf licts that would otherwise arise 
out of suspicion of the activities of the IEC as has happened in Kenya.   
5. Lessons learnt and recommendations for peacebuilding 
With its focus on political violence, this paper set out to provide an analysis 
of the nature of formation of political parties in Kenya and South Africa 
with the intention of using that analysis to underscore the indispensability 
of political parties as actors in peacebuilding efforts in both countries.
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A historical analysis provided a snapshot of how political parties 
metamorphosed into the entities that they are now in both countries. 
By understanding such metamorphoses, a practitioner is able to descry 
the linkages between the nature of the parties and their actions as far as 
political violence is concerned. 
This paper has ascertained that political parties do play a role in escalating 
and in de-escalating political violence. This is against the backdrop of the 
fact that prevention and management of political violence is an integral 
part of peacebuilding as a process. Since peacebuilding is political in nature 
(Cousens 2001:7), for the process to be legitimised, it is important that 
political parties are a part of it. Effective participation of political parties 
in this process calls for peacebuilding practitioners to design interventions 
that are congruent with the nuanced raisons d'être of political parties in 
both countries and the discernment of how their (the political parties’) 
operations have inf luenced political violence over the years.
One of the ways in which practitioners can design interventions that 
anticipate the participation of political parties as actors or beneficiaries is 
to use the conf lict mapping and analysis model espoused by Paul Wehr (see 
Jandt 2016:55). This model may enable the design of effective peacebuilding 
programmes by: 1) identifying the specific roles that political parties play 
as actors in political violence, 2) delving into specific aspects of political 
violence in the country concerned and 3) evaluating the contexts wherein 
the incidences of political violence occur.
The participation of political parties in the peacebuilding efforts in 
both countries can however be more effective if there is a solid guiding 
framework. Regulatory frameworks in both countries need to be reformed 
by the legislatures and commit political parties to be members of formalised 
NIfPs. An examination of the key regulatory frameworks that govern the 
operations of political parties in Kenya (Political parties Act: No. 11 of 
2011; The Political Parties (Amendment) (No. 2) Act 2016; The Political 
Parties (Amendment) Act 2012) and South Africa (Electoral Commission 
Act 51 1996) reveals that there is an absence of principles that explicitly 
prescribe the role of political parties in sustainable peacebuilding. 
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6. Conclusions
Political parties in Kenya and South Africa contribute to the vicious 
cycles of political violence. They have also played some crucial roles in 
the de-escalation of such violence. Analysis shows that the respective roles 
that they have played have been informed by their natures, derived from 
their historical metamorphoses. Given that peacebuilding has political 
impacts and political parties are fundamental to political processes, 
it is the conclusion of this paper that political parties are indispensable 
actors in peacebuilding. The design and implementation of peacebuilding 
interventions that effectively target political violence must therefore 
anticipate, and even encourage where possible, the involvement of political 
parties in de-escalating political violence.
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